Following Jordan’s defeat in the Six-Day War and loss of control over the West Bank, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began to launch attacks from Jordanian territory. These provoked Israeli counterattacks, threatening the peace King Hussein hoped to achieve with Israel.
PLO head Yasser Arafat ignored Hussein’s warnings and hoped to gain control over Jordan with the support of Egypt and Syria. Fighting between Jordan’s army and the PLO began in November 1969, but Hussein hoped to avoid an escalation.
The Palestinians gradually built up what amounted to a state within the kingdom. They controlled the refugee camps, smuggled in weapons that they openly brandished, ignored officials of the Jordanian government, and undermined Hussein’s authority. The king attempted to negotiate an understanding with the Palestinians, but they were unwilling to compromise and defied his authority.
The final straw for Hussein occurred when Palestinian terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) flew three hijacked planes to Jordan on September 6, 1970, and blew them up on the 12th after releasing the passengers. From that point on, Hussein’s forces increasingly clashed with the Palestinians, who were openly trying to depose him. He declared martial law on September 16 and deployed his troops to Palestinian-controlled areas.
The Israelis were naturally alarmed by a conflict not far from their borders and were worried that a PLO takeover of Jordan would pose a grave threat to their security. The United States and Great Britain were also concerned by the developments because King Hussein was viewed as a pro-Western moderate in the region, whereas the Soviets backed the Syrians and Egyptians.
The United States was also concerned about the possible intervention of Syria or Iraq. The State Department incorrectly assessed that Iraq was more likely to back the Palestinians. Instead, on September 19, Syria sent tanks to Jordan to support the Palestinians. But these were not supported by the requisite air forces, which were held back by their commander Hafez Assad.
Hussein was so afraid of being defeated that he asked the British on September 21 to intervene and to contact Jerusalem to request help from the Israelis. The British decided, however, that Hussein’s regime was “not worth prolonging” and passed the king’s request to the United States.
At 3 a.m. on the 21st, the king called the U.S. ambassador in Jordan and asked him to send an urgent message to the president. “Situation deteriorating dangerously following Syrian massive invasion…. I request immediate physical intervention both air and land as per the authorization of government to safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Jordan. Immediate air strikes on invading forces from any quarter plus air cover are imperative.”
Hussein requested that the United States launch air strikes to support his forces. President Nixon moved the Sixth Fleet closer to Jordan but preferred to have Israel intervene. On September 20, National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger informed Israel’s Ambassador to the United States Yitzhak Rabin that Hussein wanted Israel’s air force to attack the Syrians and later told Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir that the United States “would look favorably upon an Israeli air attack.” Israel did not attack but demonstrated its willingness to intervene by sending troops to the border with Syria and fighter planes over Syrian tanks in Jordan
Hussein was prepared to accept the Israelis’ help, but his troops rallied and drove the invaders out before it became necessary for Israel to join the fight. After Hussein’s forces repulsed the Syrians, they turned on the PLO, killing and wounding thousands of Palestinians and forcing thousands more to seek refuge in Syria and Lebanon. Most of the Palestinian leadership, including Arafat, wound up in Lebanon, where they soon set about undermining the central government of that country.
A ceasefire was signed on September 27, 1970, in Cairo during a meeting of Arab leaders attended by Hussein and Arafat. The terms included “withdrawal of both army and Fedayeen forces from Amman, release of detainees, return of military and civilian conditions in other towns to what they were before the crisis, restoration of security responsibility to the police and an end to the military government.”
The events in Jordan came to be known among Palestinians as “Black September.”
The fighting had several significant repercussions:
Israel’s willingness to come to the king’s aid, albeit out of self-interest, created warmer relations between Hussein and the Israeli leadership, which facilitated periodic secret meetings to try to make peace. Jordan has never again been involved in military action against Israel.
Israel’s willingness and ability to defend a U.S. ally demonstrated its strategic value to the United States.
The flood of Palestinian refugees destabilized Lebanon as the PLO created a state within the state, which later contributed to the Lebanese civil war and the first Israeli-Lebanon war.
By not providing air support Assad doomed the Syrian invasion, and the humiliating defeat paved the way for him to seize power.
The crisis in Jordan had prompted Nasser to call a meeting in Cairo of the Arab heads of state. During the talks, Nasser died of a heart attack and was replaced by his little-known vice president, Anwar Sadat.
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Sources:
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXIV, DC: U.S. State Department, pp. 601-925;
“1970: Hijacked jets destroyed by guerrillas,” BBC, (September 12, 1970).
Uri Dan, “Jordan Asked Israeli Help Vs. Syria Troops,” New York Post, (January 3, 2001);
“Black September plea to Israel,” BBC, (January 1, 2001).
Sean Durns, “Black September Remembered: How The PLO Forged The Modern Middle East,” National Interest, (August 21, 2020).
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/black-september
Israel’s Wars & Operations: The Six-Day War
(June 5 - 10, 1967)
Link:
https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-six-day-war
The Palestinian Liberation Organization
In 1963, the Arab League decided to introduce a new weapon in its war against Israel — the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO formally came into being during a 1964 meeting of the first Palestinian Congress. Shortly thereafter, the group began to splinter into various factions. Ultimately, the largest faction, Fatah, would come to dominate the organization, and its leader, Yasser Arafat, would become the PLO chairman and most visible symbol. All the groups adhered to a set of principles laid out in the Palestine National Charter, which called for Israel’s destruction.
The PLO’s belligerent rhetoric was matched by deeds. Terrorist attacks by the group grew more frequent. In 1965, 35 raids were conducted against Israel. In 1966, the number increased to 41. In just the first four months of 1967, 37 attacks were launched. The targets were always civilians. (3)
Most of the attacks involved Palestinian guerillas infiltrating Israel from Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The orders and logistical support for the attacks were coming, however, from Cairo and Damascus. Egyptian President Nasser’s main objective was to harass the Israelis, but a secondary one was to undermine King Hussein’s regime in Jordan.
King Hussein viewed the PLO as both a direct and indirect threat to his power. Hussein feared that the PLO might try to depose him with Nasser’s help or that the PLO’s attacks on Israel would provoke retaliatory strikes by Israeli forces that could weaken his authority. By the beginning of 1967, Hussein had closed the PLO’s offices in Jerusalem, arrested many of the group’s members, and withdrew recognition of the organization. Nasser and his friends in the region unleashed a torrent of criticism on Hussein for betraying the Arab cause. Hussein would soon have the chance to redeem himself.
Arab War Plans Revealed
In September 1965, Arab leaders and their military and intelligence chiefs met secretly at the Casablanca Hotel in Morocco to discuss whether they were ready to go to war against Israel and, if so, whether they should create a joint Arab command. The host of the meeting, King Hassan II, did not trust his Arab League guests and initially planned to allow a joint Shin Bet-Mossad unit known as “The Birds” to spy on the conference. A day before the conference was scheduled to begin, however, the king told them to leave out of fear they would be noticed by the Arab guests. Hassan secretly recorded the meeting and gave it to the Israelis, who learned the Arabs were gearing up for war, but were divided and unprepared.
“These recordings, which were truly an extraordinary intelligence achievement, further showed us that, on the one hand, the Arab states were heading toward a conflict that we must prepare for. On the other hand, their rambling about Arab unity and having a united front against Israel didn’t reflect real unanimity among them,” said Major General Shlomo Gazit, who headed the Research Department of Israel’s Military Intelligence Directorate. (3a)
Terror from the Heights
The breakup of the U.A.R. and the resulting political instability only made Syria more hostile toward Israel. Another major cause of the conflict was Syria’s resistance to Israel’s creation of a National Water Carrier to take water from the Jordan River to supply the country. The Syrian army used the Golan Heights, which tower 3,000 feet above the Galilee, to shell Israeli farms and villages. Syria’s attacks grew more frequent in 1965 and 1966, forcing children living on kibbutzim in the Huleh Valley to sleep in bomb shelters. Israel repeatedly protested the Syrian bombardments to the UN Mixed Armistice Commission, which was charged with policing the cease-fire, but the UN did nothing to stop Syria’s aggression — even a mild Security Council resolution expressing “regret” for such incidents was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Israel was condemned by the United Nations when it retaliated.
While the Syrian military bombardment and terrorist attacks intensified, Nasser’s rhetoric became increasingly bellicose. In 1965, he announced, “We shall not enter Palestine with its soil covered in sand; we shall enter it with its soil saturated in blood.” (4)
Again, a few months later, Nasser expressed the Arabs’ aspiration: “[el] the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinian people. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the state of Israel. The immediate aim: perfection of Arab military might. The national aim: the eradication of Israel.” (5)
Syria’s attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan Heights finally provoked a retaliatory strike on April 7, 1967. During the attack, Israeli planes shot down six Syrian fighter planes — MiGs supplied by the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, the Soviets — who had been providing military and economic assistance to both Syria and Egypt — gave Damascus false information alleging a massive Israeli military buildup in preparation for an attack. Despite Israeli denials, Syria decided to invoke its defense treaty with Egypt and asked Nasser to come to its aid.
Countdown to War
In early May, the Soviet Union gave Egypt false information that Israel had massed troops along the northern border in preparation for an attack on Syria. In response, Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border on May 15, Israel’s Independence Day. By May 18, Syrian troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights.
Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), stationed in the Sinai since 1956 as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces after Israel’s withdrawal following the Sinai Campaign, to withdraw on May 18. Without bringing the matter to the attention of the General Assembly (as his predecessor had promised), Secretary-General U Thant complied with the demand. After the withdrawal of the UNEF, the Voice of the Arabs radio station proclaimed on May 18, 1967:
As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence. (6)
An enthusiastic echo was heard on May 20 from Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad:
Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united....I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation. (7)
The Blockade
On May 23 Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping and all ships bound for Eilat. This blockade cut off Israel’s only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran.
In 1956, the United States gave Israel assurances that it recognized the Jewish State’s right of access to the Straits of Tiran. In 1957, at the UN, 17 maritime powers declared that Israel had a right to transit the Strait. Moreover, the blockade violated the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, which was adopted by the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea on April 27, 1958. (8)
President Johnson expressed the belief that the blockade was illegal and unsuccessfully tried to organize an international flotilla to test it. At the same time, he advised the Israelis not to take any military action. After the war, he acknowledged the closure of the Strait of Tiran was the casus belli (June 19, 1967):
If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Strait of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.
Escalation
Nasser was aware of the pressure he was exerting to force Israel’s hand and challenged Israel to fight almost daily. The day after the blockade was set up, he said defiantly: "The Jews threaten to make war. I reply: Welcome! We are ready for war." (10)
Nasser challenged Israel to fight almost daily. "Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight," he said on May 27. (11) The following day, he added: We will not accept any...coexistence with Israel...Today the issue is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel...The war with Israel is in effect since 1948.( 12)
King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30. Nasser then announced:
The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel...to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations. (13)
President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq joined in the war of words: "The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear -- to wipe Israel off the map." (14) On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan, and Syria.
The Arab rhetoric was matched by the mobilization of Arab forces. Approximately 465,000 troops, more than 2,800 tanks, and 800 aircraft ringed Israel. (15)
By this time, Israeli forces had been on alert for three weeks. The country could not remain fully mobilized indefinitely, nor could it allow its sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba to be interdicted. Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol had transferred all defense and military decisions to IDF chief of staff Lt. Gen. Yitzhak Rabin, who warned, “I believe we could find ourselves in a situation in which the existence of Israel is at great risk.” On June 2, 1967, Rabin told the Ministerial Committee for Defense, “This forum and myself – and I’m sure this applies to the majority of the army’s officers – don’t want war for its own sake. I think we may find ourselves in a military situation in which we have lost many of our advantages, reaching a position, which I don’t want to express too harshly, in which our existence is in serious danger. The war will be difficult and involve many casualties.” Rabin warned that Israel could not afford to wait to act. “I feel very strongly that the diplomatic-military choke hold around our neck is tightening, and I don’t see anyone else breaking it,” Rabin stated. “Time is not on our side. And in a week or two, or in three or four weeks, the situation will be worse.” (15a)
One man who opposed going to war was David Ben-Gurion. After the bitter experience of the Suez War, when he ordered the attack on Egypt without the support of the United States, and President Eisenhower subsequently forced Israel to withdraw from the territory it won in the war, Ben-Gurion believed Israel needed the support of a Western power. He also feared Israel’s weapons supplies would be jeopardized and Israeli casualties would be enormous. Some Israelis were calling for Ben-Gurion to replace Eshkol, but his anti-war views caused him to lose political support. Instead, pro-war factions of the government who thought Eshkol was too weak to lead the country successfully pressured him to appoint Moshe Dayan as defense minister.
Israel decided to preempt the expected Arab attack. To do this successfully, Israel needed the element of surprise. Had it waited for an Arab invasion, Israel would have been at a potentially catastrophic disadvantage. On June 5, Prime Minister Eshkol gave the order to attack Egypt.
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