Statutory Interpretation

[KALKI]

Statutory Interpretation


One of the functions judges perform within the English legal system is to interpret or give meaning to words and terms contained in Acts of Parliament (‘statutes’) once they are enacted by the legislative body of Parliament. In cases in which the words of the statute is clear and easy to apply to the facts in the case, the judge must give effect to the intention of Parliament. However, where the words of a statute are unclear or uncertain, in order to find out what Parliament intended, the judge will need to resolve that uncertainty through the process of construction.

The function of the courts in interpreting and construing statutes is a vital one, since it is the courts which must 'give life' to statutory provisions by considering and applying them. Although judges generally explain the meaning of statutes as they arise in individual cases, construction of statutes is only required where the statute is drafted in ‘uncertain’ or ‘ambiguous’ terms.

Problems with uncertainty and ambiguity
The problem of uncertainty may arise because it is unclear whether a particular statutory provision is meant to cover the factual situation before the court. This can be a particular problem when a situation arises which the draftsman did not envisage, possibly because the situation could not have been foreseen (especially if the statute is quite an old one). For example, in Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co [1899] AC 143, the statutory provision in question, s.1 of the Betting Act 1853, prohibited the keeping of a "house, office, room or other place" for betting. The court had to decide whether Tattersalls’ ring at an outdoor racecourse fell within the term "other place". The House of Lords held it did not as the Betting Act was meant to prohibit betting in indoor places, and Tattersalls’ ring was situated in an outdoor place and accordingly, the provisions of the Betting Act did not apply to betting in these circumstances.

Ambiguity is a problem which tends to occur less frequently than uncertainty.
It may arise where there is an error in drafting, with the result that a particular word or phrase used in a statute is capable of having two or more meanings. Since many statutes create new 'legal situations' all of these competing meanings may be quite plausible. An example of an ambiguity is provided by Fisher v Bell [1960] 3 ALL ER 731. The Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1957, made it unlawful to "offer for sale" certain offensive weapons, including "flick knives". The divisional court had to decide whether a shopkeeper who displayed flick knives was guilty of an offence under the 1957 Act. It held that he was not because, under the rules of contract law, the exhibition of goods in a shop window does not amount to an offer to sell the goods, only an ‘invitation to treat’ which is not an offer for sale.


Aids used to ascertain the meaning of Parliament
When statutory words are uncertain or ambiguous judges can use ‘rules of construction’ to assist them in determining what Parliament intended. The three main rules of used are the literal rule, the golden (or purposive) rule and the mischief rule (or the rule in Heydon’s Case).


The literal rule
Using this rule, the court may start out by looking at the literal, (or ordinary and everyday) meaning of the words used by Parliament in order to decide what Parliament intended.

For example, in Cresswell v B.O.C. Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 1556, the statute in question, the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980 exempted agricultural buildings and land from the payment of rates. Rates were payable in the case of land used for ‘livestock’. The applicant argued his fish farm was exempted from rates, because fish were not ‘livestock’. After looking at the ordinary meaning of the word ‘livestock’, the Court of Appeal agreed with the applicant and upheld his claim.

Problems with the literal rule.
It has been argued by some academics that this rule is outmoded and hinders, rather than aid, interpretation. Additionally, according to Lord Denning, the literal rule should not be applied "...where it would produce manifest absurdity, or consequences which can never have been intended by the legislature". In other words, if the words used by Parliament are relatively clear, the courts should not insert words which Parliament never envisaged or which are inconsistent with the intention of the legislature. This is supported by the dissenting judgment of Viscount Dilhorne in Kammins Ballrooms Co., Ltd v Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd [1971] 2 All ER 871. In this case, s.2 (3) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 clearly provided that no application for a new tenancy was allowed unless it was made not less than 2 and no more than 4 months after the tenant’s request for a new tenancy. The court was asked to consider an application made less than 2 months after the tenants request. Rather than following the clear intention of the legislature, the majority House of Lords allowed the application, essentially ignoring the wording of the 1954 Act. Dilhorne however stated that "if the language is clear and explicit, the court must give effect to it" ([1971] 2 All ER 871 at 883).


The Golden or Purpose rule
Where the literal rule cannot be applied because to do so would produce absurdity or go against what Parliament originally intended, an exception to it has arisen, called the ‘golden rule’.

This rule allows the courts to vary or modify the language of a statute to avoid inconvenience, but nothing more than that, Becke v Smith (1836) 2 M&W. The most quoted case illustrating this rule is Re Sigsworth [1935] Ch 89. Here, a man murdered his mother. He was her ‘sole issue’ under the meaning of the Administration of Estates Act 1925 and if the literal rule was applied, he would have stood to inherit her property. In order to prevent this, the golden rule was applied. It was held that the common law rule that a murderer cannot take any benefit from a person he has murdered prevailed over the apparently clear words of the statue.

The case shows that where literal rule creates an absurdity, the judge can use the golden rule to vary or modify Parliament’s original intention. However, it should be noted that generally, the courts are not easily persuaded to reject the plain words of the statue.


The mischief rule or the rule in Heydon's case
This is sometimes known as the rule in Heydon’s Case (1584). Here the court looks at the purpose for which the statute was passed and tries to resolve any uncertainty or ‘mischief’ created by the lack of definition of the previous common law. Before applying this rule, the court must ask itself the following 4 questions:


What was the common law before the making of the Act?
What was the mischief or defect for which the common law did not provide for?
What remedy did Parliament provide?
What was the true reason for the remedy.
A good illustration of the rule can be seen in Gorris v Scott (1874) LR 9 Exchequer 125. A statute required that those parts of a ship occupied by animals were to be divided into pens in order to prevent the spread of disease. The defendant failed to pen sheep he was carrying on behalf of the plaintiff. This caused the sheep to be washed overboard during a storm. The plaintiff sued the defendant for failing to pen the sheep as required by the statute. As penning was obviously intended to prevent the spread of disease and not to protect the sheep from being washed overboard, the plaintiff’s claim failed.

If we apply the 4 questions above to the case of Gorris v Scott, in answer to Question,


the common law did not cover animals being penned onboard ships; in answer to Question,
the mischief for which common law did not provide was the spread of disease; in answer to Question,
the remedy Parliament provided was a statutory requiring animals to be penned in order to prevent the spread of disease; and in answer to Question,
clearly the true reason for the remedy was only to prevent the spread of disease.
Another example of the mischief rule can be seen in the case of Smith v Hughes (1960). Two women were convicted of soliciting contrary to the Street Offences Act 1959. The women were tapping on a window in an attempt to attract passers by. It was obvious that they were soliciting. The question was whether they were soliciting in a street or public place. Applying the 4 mischief rule questions,


the common law did not cover soliciting;
the mischief was soliciting in the street;
the remedy Parliament provided was a statute to clean up the streets; and
the reason for the remedy was to prevent prostitutes soliciting in the streets.
Lord Parker was of the opinion that it did not matter whether these ladies actually were in the street or trying to attract custom from a window which overlooked a street. It was clear what sort of behaviour the Act was drafted to prevent.

The mischief rule was updated in Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] 1 All ER 286, where Lord Diplock stated 3 conditions for its application:


it must be possible to determine from consideration of the Act as a whole precisely the mischief that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy;
it must be apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had inadvertently overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, the mischief;
it must be possible to state "with certainty" what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had the omission been drawn to their attention, ([1980] AC 74 at 105).

Other aids used to interpret statutes
The following aids are only used in specific circumstances as follows:

The ejusdem generis rule.
Under this rule, general words which follow 2 or more particular words in a statute must be interpreted as belonging to the same class or ‘genus’ (or are ejusdem generis) as the particular words. For example, in Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse (see section 1 above), the general words "other place" follow 3 particular words, "house, office, room". This means that the words other place must be interpreted as referring to something similar to a house, office or room, in other words, something that is indoor, rather than outdoor. As we saw in this case, the court held that Tattersalls’ ring at a racecourse did not fall within the definition of ‘other place’ as it was clearly outdoor.

The expressio unius exclusio alterius rule.
Simply put, this means that where something is expressed in a statute, the statute only applies to that thing and nothing else. For example, in R v Inhabitants of Sedgley (1831) 2 B & Ad 65, it was held that a statute for rating occupiers of "lands, houses, tithes and coal mines" did not apply to any other kind of mine.

The noscitur a sociis rule.
Here, where 2 or more words follow each other in a statute, they are interpreted in a similar context. In IRC v Frere [1964] 3 All ER 796, the statute used the words "interest, annuities or other annual payments". The court had to decide what type of interest the statute referred to. Held, as the word ‘interest’ was follow ‘annuities and other annual payments’, the interest was meant to be interpreted as annual interest.

The Interpretation Act 1978.
This statute provides interpretations of words and phrases commonly used in Acts of Parliament, like ‘he’ and ‘she’. For example, s.6 of the 1978 Act provides:

".......unless the contrary intention appears (a) words importing the masculine gender include the feminine; (b) words importing the feminine gender include the masculine; (c) words in the singular include the plural and words in the plural include the singular".
It should be noted that the interpretations in the 1978 Act will not apply if Parliament expressly or impliedly says it does not apply in any subsequent statute.
Presumptions.
Certain things are presumed by the courts when they interpret statutes. A few of these are as follows:


liability is not imposed without it being proved that there is fault on the part of the defendant, unless the legislature states otherwise, Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132. For example, in the criminal law, many crimes require proof of a guilty mind or ‘mens rea’. But there are some offences which are by statute, crimes of ‘strict liability’, which means the defendant can be found guilty of a strict liability offence without proof fault on his part. In these situations, all that needs to be established is that the defendant carried out an act criminalised by statute.
if an Act of Parliament does not expressly alter the law, it is presumed that Parliament did not intend to alter the law.
unless there is an express provision to the contrary, it is presumed that a statute will not deprive individuals of vested rights.
it is presumed that individuals cannot oust the jurisdiction of the courts.
Unless expressed named in it, it is presumed that a statute will not bind the Crown.

Material aids.
There are internal and external aids to interpretation and construction of statutes. Some assist in interpretation more than others. Internal aids are found in the statute itself. Each statute will describe the general effects of the Act. This is carried out in the Long Title of the Act. For example, the long title of the Wills Act of 1861 states it is an "Act to amend the law with respect to wills of personal estate made by British subjects". The Short Title is the title by which the statute is commonly cited, i.e., the Wills Act 1861. The Preamble is not frequently used in modern statutes. It sets out the reasons for the statute being passed. Some statutes contain Headings and marginal notes. These are not part of the statute itself and are often inserted for reference purposes. Headings have been used to construct uncertain or ambiguous statutes. Many modern statutes also have interpretation sections which explain the various words and phrases contained in the statute.

External aids are ones found outside the statute, such as the dictionary meaning of a word in a statute. While debates of a Bill as it goes through the various report and committee stages in both Houses of Parliament are not used as aids to interpretation and construction, reports of the Law Commission and Law Reform Committees may be used. In Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 All ER 1, the House of Lords held that the courts may refer to /Hansards (the official record of debates and proceedings in Parliament) in order to interpret statutes in limited circumstances, namely, where the statute is ambiguous or leads to an absurdity; the debate relied on is clear; and the debate is made up of 1 or more statements by a minister.

Judicial precedent.
The decision of judges cases decided in the superior courts is also an important guide to interpreting what a particular statute means, especially for the lower courts